






  UNIVERSITY  O F   C O LOGNE
  WOR KIN G   PAPER   S E RIES  IN  ECONOMICS
No. 36
DOES LABORATORY TRADING MIRROR BEHAVIOR
IN REAL WORLD MARKETS? FAIR BARGAINING 
AND COMPETITIVE BIDDING ON EBAY
GARY E BOLTON
AXEL OCKENFELS 
Does Laboratory Trading Mirror Behavior in Real World Markets? 






                                                 
* Gary Bolton, Smeal College of Business, Penn State University, University Park,  PA 16802 USA, 
 
Penn State University, USA 
   
Axel Ockenfels 
University of Cologne, Germany 
 
 




We conducted a framed field experiment on eBay, and examined to what extent both 
social and competitive laboratory behavior are robust to institutionally complex real 
world markets with experienced traders, who selected themselves into these markets. 
For buyers, the data strongly confirm the dichotomy between equitable bargaining and 
competitive bidding predicted by social preference equilibrium and suggested by lab 
evidence.  Importantly, reputation building on eBay cannot explain the social behavior. 
We also  observe that  the behavioral patterns in the field experiment mirror fully 
naturally occurring trading patterns in the market.  In particular, some sellers fail to use 
their commitment power as predicted by theories of both selfish and social behavior, 
with the pattern of deviation reflecting traders’ market experience outside the 
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I. Introduction 
People profess preferences for fairness.  Less certain is whether they act on these 
preferences in a consistent way, or whether these preferences bend to circumstance.  The issue 
has implications for the measure of social welfare and so institutional design.  Economists have 
long observed that competitive market behavior accords well with pure self-interest, and so 
markets arguably attenuate preferences for fairness.  More recently, social preference theory 
argues that preferences for fairness are  compatible with competitive behavior.  The primary 
evidence for this view comes from laboratory market and bilateral bargaining games.  These 
exhibit a pattern of competitive and fair behavior that social preferences can explain but self-
interest alone cannot.  The catch is that the laboratory is itself a special institution, and arguably 
different in many ways from real world markets. 
This paper reports an experiment performed on eBay to examine whether the laboratory 
findings concerning fair bilateral bargaining and competitive bidding are robust to a natural 
trading system.  The field  games we examine are substantially more elaborate than their 
laboratory cousins (ex., Roth et al. 1991).  Yet as with the laboratory games, the field games have 
similar equilibrium paths, assuming selfish motives and rational behavior.  In the laboratory 
versions, observed behavior in the bilateral bargaining game is strongly influenced by equity 
considerations, whereas behavior in the market game follows the selfish equilibrium closely.  
There has recently been a good deal of controversy over the extent to which results of 
laboratory studies in economics extend to more natural settings.  Speaking of the differences in 
lab and field institutions, Levitt and List (2007) posit that, along with monetary considerations, 
human decisions are influenced by (1) the presence of moral and ethical considerations; (2) the 
nature and extent of scrutiny of one’s actions by others; (3) the context in which the decision is 
embedded; (4) self-selection of the individuals making the decisions; and (5) the stakes of the 
game.  The authors started a fruitful debate arguing that, “Because the lab systematically differs 
from most naturally occurring environments on these dimensions, experiments may not always 
yield results that are readily generalizable“ (p. 170).  
Ours is a framed field experiment (Harrison and List 2004, List 2006a), primarily because 
traders knew that they are taking part in an experiment (so we cannot derive conclusions for 
situations in which traders do not know that they are taking part in an experiment as in List 
2006b), and because we induced public knowledge about the degree of buyer competition and the 
maximal economic surplus (so we cannot derive conclusions for situations in which traders do   2 
not know). One practical reason for inducing this knowledge is that this is the standard in related 
laboratory environments, and so this allows us to directly compare results.  More importantly, 
however,  models of inequality aversion, which are widely applied to related  laboratory 
environments, predict selfish  behavior if traders expect competition or do not know the 
comparison standard.  Laboratory evidence confirms this (e.g., Cooper and Kagel, forthcoming).  
This implies that in order to investigate – based on clear theoretical predictions – whether social 
preferences as observed in the laboratory can also be identified in our naturally occurring context, 
we need control what people know about competition and surplus; otherwise we could not be 
sure if observed selfish behavior is just due to a lack of information or due to different 
preferences (see section II for more details, and section IV for a discussion of related literature).  
Another advantage our design affords is that it captures the natural circumstances of eBay’s 
marketplace along the five above dimensions mentioned above: The transactions take place on 
eBay’s platform according to all of eBay’s naturally evolved rules.  Subjects are experienced 
traders who self selected themselves into the eBay environment for their own, independent 
purposes (including into their market roles as buyers or sellers).  The stakes reflect those of the 
average transaction on eBay.  As is common in many markets, trader behavior on eBay is highly 
scrutinized, both by other traders and by the market’s management.  EBay traders post 
“feedback” on their experience with other traders, information made available to all traders when 
deciding on future trading partners.  Moral and ethical considerations are part of these postings.  
The actions in our experiment were official eBay transactions and became part of these feedback 
histories; this allows us to link some of the experimental data to naturally occurring field data. 
Behind the scenes, eBay management monitors the site for malfeasance, and this too plays a role 
in our experiment. 
Our test addresses another factor that is a critical differentiator of lab and field ecologies, 
this being complexity.  The laboratory is designed for highly controlled empirical research.  
Trading systems are typically stripped down to match the parsimony of the theory being tested, 
with the goal of minimizing complicating factors and associated (boundedly) rational responses.  
In contrast, real world trading systems endure because they facilitate trade for profit.  They are 
agglomerations of  formal and  informal  rules,  norms and heuristics that, together with trader 
experiences, histories and networks, evolve over time.  As such, the natural trading system is far 
more complex than what has been implemented in a laboratory, and thus also creates scope to 
observe more complex behavior including non-rational trading patterns.   3 
To give an example of system complexity in the present context, eBay’s trading rules 
have the same first mover-second mover format as do ultimatum bargaining games (ex., Güth et 
al. 1982) and simple market games (ex., Roth et al. 1991).  In both eBay and the lab games, first 
movers have a significant advantage in that they have considerable commitment power, able to 
specify key terms of the deal.  Yet the eBay platform offers the sellers who set up the trade more 
options than are typically studied in a laboratory (ex., auction, posted price), with subsidiary rules 
serving practical purposes that must be abided by.  EBay is also a far noisier trading environment 
than the lab.  For instance, computer processing time and connection speed may prevent very late 
bids from being accepted, traders might employ shill-bidding or other fraudulent strategies, or 
they may experience computer, server, health or other problems which can affect their trading.  
Laboratory studies typically avoid such complexities. 
The present experiment exploits the natural game forms implicit in eBay’s trading system 
in a way that – despite of the institutional complexities – enables us to classify the behavior we 
observe as either in-selfish-equilibrium or in-social-equilibrium or as out-of-equilibrium.  We 
only need establish the necessary information structure and opportunity costs by manipulating the 
object traded (which we do without bending the natural rules of trade).  This also allows us to 
relate behavior in our field experiment to robust laboratory findings, and when they agree we can 
be rather confident that behavior in our field environment is part of a more general trading 
inclination.  Finally, eBay permits us to check for relationships between behavior inside the 
experiment and fully naturally occurring behavior outside the experiment.  As in many markets, 
after the price has been determined, and independent of the degree of competition in the price 
discovery phase, all eBay transactions boil down to bilateral ones.  To facilitate this phase, eBay 
makes available transaction histories of traders, including reputation, via eBay’s feedback forum.  
Indeed, transactions in our experiment became part of our traders’ official eBay trading histories.  
We exploit these links between bilateral exchange in and outside the experiment, to test several 
hypotheses, partly suggested by others concerning fully natural (eBay) trading. 
Our findings complement observations from field experiments conducted in very different 
domains and with different degrees of control (discussed in section IV).  For example, parts of 
our conclusions confirm the finding in List (2004), who observes competitive behavior in 
markets with face-to-face interaction both in laboratory and framed field experiments, and the 
finding of List (2006) who reports data from artefactual and framed experiments that are in line   4 
with social preferences.
1  One of the advantages of an experiment on eBay is relative ease of 
replication, admitting the kind of ‘losing control in a controlled way’ research program that has 
proven productive in the lab.
2  Easily accessible field test beds control for the differences in 
complexity across field environments, and permit the method of replicating existing results and 
testing new hypotheses in a series of experiments.  Online markets, being widely accessible, are 
one such set of test beds (also see Chen et al. 2010).
3
The entire experiment was conducted on eBay’s German market platform, which is 
mostly equivalent to the U.S. eBay market (the relevant exceptions will be discussed).  The 
experiment offered no explanation of the platform’s trading rules: Subjects were simply referred 
to eBay’s own explanation and presentation of the trading formats.  Our traders neither showed 
up personally nor signed any documents or receipts before, during or after the experiment.  Nor 
did they have to report the data to us, this being available on eBay for anyone to download.
  We discuss this issue along with related 
research in section IV, after discussing our experiment (section II) and results (section III).  
Section V concludes. 
 
II. Design of the experiment and hypotheses 
4
                                                 
1 An artefactual experiment is a laboratory experiment with a “non-standard” subject pool.  Where social preferences 
have less of an effect in List (2006) is when he moves from framed to natural field experiments, wherein sellers do 
not know that they are taking part in an experiment.   
 
2  For instance, it took many experiments, performed by many different investigators, to vet the robustness of social 
preferences in bilateral bargaining under fully laboratory conditions; for reviews see, ex., Roth (1995), Bolton (1999) 
and Camerer (2003).  For a sample of, and references to, additional work see Andreoni (2003). 
3 EBay’s markets are popular with a large and diverse set of traders, a total 222 million registered users in 33 
countries, all in cyberspace.  For a history of eBay, which touches the early evolution of trading rules and norms, see 
Cohen (2002). For more information on eBay, including statistics on usage, size of company, international breadth 
etc., see http://investor.ebay.com/index.cfm.  For a survey on economic eBay research see Ockenfels et al. (2006). 
See Harrison and List’s (2004) and List’s (2006a) taxonomy of field experiments, classifying them depending on 
their distance between the extreme of laboratory and natural environments.  Also see John List’s bibliography of 
field experiments at http://www.fieldexperiments.com.  Kagel (1995) provides an introduction into laboratory 
auction studies. 
4 However, after the experiment was finished, we sent out a question to selected eBay buyers in order to better 
understand the motives behind their behavior; see section III.3. 
 All 
communication between traders and experimenter was done via the Internet.  Communication 
was automated, with the exception of answers to private questions to the experimenter (see 
Appendix for all standardized communication).  Prior to participating, traders had to confirm on a 
webpage that they were available at the time of the experiment, and they had to correctly answer 
some questions to demonstrate basic understanding of the set-up (ex., the number of potential   5 
buyers; see Appendix).  All game payoffs were wired in order to keep the money flows under our 
control.  In addition, independent of trading success, sellers were paid all eBay transaction fees. 
In total, we recruited 400 experienced eBay traders from student populations at four 
German universities: Bonn, Cologne, Jena and Magdeburg.  The average feedback score in our 
subject population was 89, and the median was 44.
 5   This implies that the average (median) 
subject successfully completed at least 89 (44) eBay transactions as a winning bidder or as a 
seller, and thus has gained considerable experience with eBay’s market platform.  To participate, 
a trader had to have a valid eBay account and a feedback score of at least one.  In addition, we 
made sure that the sellers in our experiment had a feedback score of at least 10, and received at 
least one of the feedback points in the role of a seller, guaranteeing some minimum role-specific 
trading experience.
6
Another important control is induced valuations (Smith 1982), permitting a clear 
interpretation of agents’ pecuniary incentives.  We did this by creating tradable “certificates” that 
had specific values to specific traders.  These control the opportunity costs associated with a trade.  
Induced values were chosen such that the equilibrium prices in the experiment roughly match 
    
 
II.1 Gaining control on eBay  
While EBay’s trading institutions and options (the rules of the game) are substantially 
more detailed and complex than what is typically implemented in the laboratory, they lend 
themselves to relatively  crisp analysis  –  provided that we gain control over some critical 
theoretical parameters.  To the extent possible, we crafted the controls to mirror the pattern of 
natural activity.  For example, the geographic dispersion of our subjects permitted us to select 
cohorts of traders that are anonymous to one another and unlikely to have a common history or 
future.  In this way, our design minimizes repeated game and social interaction effects, something 
that is important when interpreting motivations behind behavior.  At the same time, this 
geographic dispersion –  and associated one shot trading –  mirrors the norm on eBay (e.g., 
Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002). 
                                                 
5 The feedback score is the sum of all positive feedbacks received minus the negatives received.  Thus, a feedback 
score of n  implies that the trader must have successfully completed at  least  n  eBay transactions.  Because 
transactions may not end successfully (a seller may find no buyer and a bidder may not win), or successful 
transactions may end without or with negative feedback, the feedback score underestimates the traders’ experience.  
It is, however, often used as a proxy for experience; see, e.g., Roth and Ockenfels (2002). 
6 By the rules of eBay Germany, a seller can only choose the buy-it-now format if he has at least 10 positive 
feedback points,  so that this restriction also made sure that all sellers had the same offer formats available 
(http://pages.ebay.de/help/sell/fixedprice-faq.html).   6 
average prices on eBay.  The equilibrium price in both treatments will be about 20 € (see section 
II.4), or about  $24  at the time of the experiment.  According to eBay, in 2005 (when we 
conducted our experiment), about 72 million active eBay users generated a gross merchandise 
volume of $44.30b in 1.88b listings, yielding an average price of $23.56.
7
                                                 
7  See http://investor.ebay.com/downloads/fund_Metrics.pdf. 
 
We made buyer and seller valuations and the degree of competition (that is, the number of 
buyers with positive valuations for a given certificate) public knowledge.  This choice was not 
driven by a goal to maximize the realism of our setting, but rather to gain sufficient control for a 
clean derivation of hypotheses. It has been shown, both in theory and in the laboratory, that to the 
extent traders expect competition or do not know the economic surplus to be distributed, social 
preferences are consistent with selfish behavior (see, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and 
Ockenfels 2000,  Card et al. 2011, and Ockenfels et al. 2011 and the references therein).  So, in 
order to rule out the possibility that selfish behavior is the result of limited information rather 
than selfish preferences, we provided the relevant information.  Also, these features align our 
setting with a large class of well-known laboratory bargaining and price competition games with 
publicly known valuations (section II.4), and thus allows us to link our results back to lab 
phenomena.   
On eBay, the distributions of valuations and number of bidders vary widely, given the 
wide array of goods and trader sub-populations on the platform.  Regarding the valuations, there 
often  appears to be considerable uncertainty, although we do not know of any study that 
measures how the degree of uncertainty varies across bidders and products (we get back to this in 
our concluding section). Regarding competition, the number of bidders in eBay auctions follows 
a power law distribution, which implies that if there are bidders at all, one-bidder interaction is 
the most likely scenario (e.g., Yang et al. 2003).  For eBay Germany, where our experiment took 
place, Namazi and Schadschneider (2006) found that about 8 percent of all eBay auctions have 
exactly one bidder.  So, while usually an eBay-seller cannot be sure ex-ante about the number of 
active bidders, our experimental conditions capture two simple scenarios, one or multiple bidders, 
which are both typical for eBay transactions and so must both be taken into consideration by 
(rational) sellers when devising selling strategies.   
   7 
II.2 Bilateral trading environment 
The experiment involves a bilateral trading environment and a competitive trading 
environment.  In each encounter of the bilateral trading environment (BT), one seller and one 
buyer met to transact a single certificate, with a value of zero to the seller and 20 € to the buyer.   
Each participant was invited to engage in exactly one trading encounter.  All this information was 
part of the general instructions sent out to all traders participating in the BT treatment. 
EBay rules require that the seller first chooses a trading format along with a price offer.  
The trading format can be an auction, buy-it-now (BIN), which is essentially a posted price, or a 
combined auction plus BIN.
8  The price offer is a start price if the seller chooses the auction 
format, a fixed price if the BIN format, or both if the hybrid format.  If the seller chooses the 
auction format, a buyer can start bidding in an open, dynamic second-price auction.
9
Altogether, there were 50 buyer-seller pairs involving 100 participants.  The start time 
was restricted in order to insure that offers were made independently (Monday, 10/10/2005, 3pm).  
No offer could be submitted after this time; in particular, sellers were not allowed to submit a 
second offer in case the first one did not end in a transaction.  Also, sellers were told to post their 
offers under a specific eBay category, and to use a specified item description, in order to suppress 
both tacit and explicit communication between traders (known to have an effect in lab studies).
  In case of a 
buy-it-now offer, a buyer can accept the fixed-price specified by the seller.  Sellers are also free 
to choose the duration of the offer, from 3 to maximally 10 days.  By eBay’s rules, however, all 
offers must end at a publicly known and predetermined time.   
10
                                                 
8 In the latter case, a buyer who chooses the BIN-option ends the auction immediately.  If, however, the first buyer 
submits an auction bid, the BIN-option disappears and the auction proceeds normally.  About one third of all eBay 
transactions were completed via BIN-offers in 2005, the rest via auctions.  At the time of our experiment, eBay’s 
“best-offer” format already available in the U.S. (which allows ‘hidden’ negotiations) was not available in Germany. 
9 More specifically, eBay asks the bidders to submit maximum bids (called “proxy bids”) and explains that "eBay 
will bid incrementally on your behalf up to your maximum bid, which is kept secret from other eBay users."  That is, 
once a bidder submits his (proxy) bid, eBay displays the currently winning bid as the minimum increment above the 
previous high proxy bid or, in case there is only one bidder, equal to the auction start price.  At the end of the auction, 
the bidder who submitted the highest bid wins the auctioned item and pays a price equal to the second-highest bid 
plus the minimum increment. See eBay.com or eBay.de for more details and Ockenfels and Roth (2006) for a 
description of eBay’s auction rules from an auction theoretic perspective.   
10 The eBay category was  “Sammeln & Seltenes > Technik & Geräte > Wissenschaft & Medizin > Sonstige.” 
(“Collectibles > Technology & Tools > Science & Medicine > Miscellaneous”).  Translated from German, the item 
description was: “This offer is placed as a part of a research project.  The certificate is only valuable to you when you 
are registered as a participant of the project and are informed about the article number of this offer.  Please refrain 
from asking the seller questions.”     
  
Finally, sellers were not allowed to use any marketing options, such as bold font, highlight etc., 
or to ask for shipping or handling costs.        8 
Once the seller informed the experimenter about the offer identity number, we checked if 
everything was in line with the rules and only then did we inform a randomly selected buyer from 
a different university population about the offer identity number (so the buyer could not 
communicate with the seller prior to the offer posting).  The buyer could then accept the offer by 
bidding (at least) the start price in the auction or by accepting the BIN-offer, respectively.  If the 
buyer chooses to let the offer time expire without accepting the price offer, both buyer and seller 
end up with zero payoffs.   
While BT roughly resembles laboratory bilateral bargaining games such as the ultimatum 
game, it differs in important respects.  First of all, the eBay seller has more options than typically 
allotted a first mover in a laboratory bargaining game.  Also, unlike in laboratory bargaining 
games, we did not explicitly point buyers to the option of ‘rejecting’ an offer – traders were 
simply told they were free to take any action as long as it is in line with eBay’s trading rules.  Not 
being given an explicit option of rejecting an offer may affect the likelihood of choosing it.
11
The game resembles various laboratory price competition games, but it too differs from 
the laboratory settings in important ways.  First of all, typical laboratory Bertrand games (e.g., 
Dufwenberg and Gneezy 2000, Roth et al. 1991) and laboratory second-price auctions (see Kagel 
 
Other differences include that buyers were free to choose the timing of their bids; other traders 
(without induced valuations for the ‘certificate’, including shill bidders) can submit bids; traders 
could in principle contact each other (though, we do not know of any such instance); they could 
see the opponents’ reputation, and, if the offer is accepted, leave feedback on each other.  All of 
these features can have and some do have implications for the theoretical analysis and the actual 
trading behavior, as demonstrated in sections II.4 and III. 
 
II.3 Competitive trading environment  
In the competitive trading environment (CT) one seller met 9 buyers to transact one 
trading certificate.  As in BT, the value of the certificate to the seller was zero, while the value to 
each buyer was 20 €. Altogether, there were 30 markets (300 subjects).  Each participant was 
invited to engage in exactly one trading encounter.  No subject participated in the bilateral trading 
encounters.  In each market, bidders were recruited from all four universities.  All offers started 
on Monday, 11/14/2005 at 3pm.  Everything else was as in the bilateral trading environment. 
                                                 
11 Also, one loses some control over why an offer is not accepted; we will come back to this when we analyze the 
data.    9 
1995 for a survey) involve sealed bidding, while eBay involves open bidding, allowing the 
possibility of coordinated bidding (section II.4).  Also, in laboratory price competition among 
buyers, sellers typically do not assume any active role.  However, on eBay, sellers choose formats 
and price-offers, which turn out to be theoretically and behaviorally relevant (section II.4).  
Another difference is that the “market game” by Roth et al. (1991) allows the seller to reject the 
best offer, while the highest bid on eBay automatically establishes a binding contract. 
 
II.4 Theory and hypotheses 
Our two central hypotheses differ regarding the extent of advantage sellers gain from their 
commitment power across BT and CT environments.  Our null hypothesis is derived under the 
assumption that traders in the market act to maximize their pecuniary gains.  The alternative 
hypothesis is derived under the assumption that traders maximize social preferences, as often 
supported in laboratory environments.  Proofs of the hypotheses are based on perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium, which reduces to perfect equilibrium when we assume selfish preferences since then 
games are complete information. 
12
There are many social preference models.  Here, we restrict our attention to the models by 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), who are outcome-oriented and thus 
tend to be simpler than models of reciprocity that are based on psychological game theory, such 
as Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004).
  
13
                                                 
12 We caution that because the theoretical predictions are quite demanding and because we do not give our traders 
learning opportunities within our framed experiment (which includes atypical aspects such as fictitious commodities 
and public knowledge of values and degree of competition), one should not expect that equilibrium predictions are 
fully supported by the data.  In fact, as we will argue, the evidence suggests that out-of-experiment experience and 
mistakes matter. 
13 This is not an unusual approach in the experimental economics literature, and seems especially justified in our 
context, because most social preference models predict the same or similar behavioral patterns in standard ultimatum 
bargaining environments – although the underlying motives and so behavioral predictions may differ significantly in 
non-standard games; see Cooper and Kagel (forthcoming) for the usage, differences and limitations of social 
preference models in experimental economics.  
  There are also many ways to model 
eBay.  Again, we restrict ourselves to two prominent approaches.  One is to abstract away from 
all dynamics and model eBay as a second-price sealed bid auction.  In fact, Bajari and Hortaçsu 
(2003) show that under certain assumptions, equilibrium in a dynamic eBay auction model is 
formally equivalent to the equilibrium in a second-price sealed-bid auction model.  Ockenfels and 
Roth (2006), on the other hand, develop a game theoretic model of eBay’s dynamics, in which 
early bids are modeled as taking place at times t on the half open interval [0,1), while late bids 
happen at time t = 1. Thus there is always time to follow an early bid with another bid, but late   10 
bids happen simultaneously, when it is too late to submit a subsequent bid in response. Early bids 
are transmitted with probability 1, while late bids are successfully transmitted with some 
probability  p  that may be smaller than one.  For our private value environment, this model 
implies a continuum of equilibria.  
Our hypotheses describe the most straightforward equilibrium patterns.  In addition, we 
outline the implications of other equilibria, resulting from the dynamics of eBay bidding and 
other institutional complexities.  While our two hypotheses serve as a first benchmark, we discuss 
our data with respect to the full set of equilibria.  
 
Null  hypothesis (based on selfish  preferences): Independent of the treatment, sellers are 
indifferent between the BIN-format, the auction format and the hybrid format.  Regardless of 
format, seller choice of start- or BIN-price (both in hybrid offer-format) is equal to the buyer 
valuation of 20 €.
14
There is also a ‘selfish equilibrium’ in CT with a low auction start price and at least two 
bidders successfully bidding their full values (and so again, a final price of 20 €).  But if we 
consider eBay’s dynamics, a low start price would allow bidders to coordinate on low-price 
equilibria through early or late bidding.  Ockenfels and Roth (2006) demonstrate, in an eBay 
private-value second-price auction model that matches the bidder situation in our CT condition in 
every relevant detail, that there are ‘late bidding equilibria’, in which all buyers bid values in the 
  At least one buyer accepts the proposed price. 
 
  Proof: EBay requires sellers to stipulate an initial price offer either in the form of a start 
price for the auction or a BIN price, or both.  The price offer is known to the potential buyers, 
because we chose an eBay category that does not allow a hidden auction reserve price.  Moreover, 
the price-offer is a credible commitment, because when trade fails to be executed, sellers were 
not allowed to start a second offering.  This was public information available to all traders.  That 
the null hypothesis is a perfect equilibrium regardless of the degree of competition then follows 
from straightforward backward induction.   
 
                                                 
14 Strictly speaking, of course, an offer of 20 € makes the buyer indifferent and thus may be rejected, in which case 
the equilibrium price in our experiment is 19.99 €.  Also, if buyers require more than one cent to break the 
indifference, an alternative null hypothesis would be that the seller payoff is smaller than 19.99 € – but the same in 
bilateral and competitive trading.  (As we will see, both hypotheses will be rejected.)  For simplicity of exposition, 
however, we drop equilibria with 20 – epsilon € payoffs for the rest of this theory section.  We will come back to 
such equilibria in the data section.   11 
closing seconds of the auction.
15   Because late bids run the risk of not being successfully 
transmitted to eBay, it can happen with positive probability that no bids come through, which 
implies zero revenues, or that only one bid comes through, which because of eBay’s second-price 
rule implies that the auction revenue is equal to the auction start price.
16
Alternative hypothesis (based on social preferences): (1) In BT, the sellers’ average price offer is 
smaller than predicted by the null hypothesis but is always at least 10 €.  All buyers accept price 
offers of 10 € but some do not accept price offers of more than 10 €.  (2) In CT, it is convenient to 
  However, all of these 
late bidding equilibria imply an outcome that gives positive chance to the seller receiving less 
than the entire pie, while in our CT treatment, the seller can unilaterally force the null hypothesis 
equilibrium, thereby capturing the entire pie with probability 1 by setting the start- or BIN-price 
to 20 €.  So, before collecting the data, we decided to stick to the null hypothesis as our central 
benchmark.  (Yet, as we will see later, the data speak more in favor of the prediction that sellers 
rely on buyer competition and that this reliance is justified.) 
 
  We next turn to examine behavior under the assumption that traders value relative as well 
as pecuniary payoffs (they have social preferences) as modelled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and 
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).  Both models posit heterogeneity with respect to how players trade-
off pecuniary and relative payoffs, making these games of incomplete information.  The specifics 
of the alternative hypothesis are derived from the Bolton and Ockenfels model, although similar 
results obtain from the Fehr and Schmidt model (discrepancies are pointed out in the footnotes).  
In the Bolton and Ockenfels model, individual utility is defined as u(x,σ), u increasing in own 
payoff of x and decreasing as relative payoff σ moves away from 1/n, where n = 2 in BT and 10 
in CT; if total player payoffs, c, are non-zero,  σ  =  x/c, otherwise σ  = 1/n.  As before, to 
economize on space, we refer the reader to proofs in the literature where possible.  
 
                                                 
15 See their Theorem on p. 303, in which they assume that all values are drawn from a degenerate distribution with 
all its mass at H (= 20 € in our experiment).  Their proof also implies that there is no late bidding equilibrium if the 
start price is equal to H, in which case there is a continuum of equilibria in all of which bidders push the price up to 
H at some time ‘early’ in the auction. 
16 Any ‘early’ bid immediately triggers a price war in which all bidders bid their values early.  Because bidding value 
early is also an equilibrium strategy, this threat is credible.  Similar late bidding equilibria could in principle also 
exist in the bilateral trading environment.  At the time of the experiment, eBay allowed sellers in certain categories to 
lower one’s start price as long as no bid has been submitted. This creates incentives for buyers, when no BIN-price is 
offered, to delay the bid until very late, when there is a positive probability of conflict, in the hope that the seller will 
revise his minimum demand (e.g., Ma and Manove 1993; see also Roth et al. 1988).  However, in the categories 
chosen for the experiment, this option was not available.   12 
distinguish selfish and fair-minded sellers: (i) A selfish seller uses the auction format with a start 
price of 18 €. The final price of the auction is bid to 20 €.  (ii) Fair-minded sellers use the BIN-
format; a price-offer at or below 18 € is accepted. 
   
  Proof of (1):  Given the Bolton and Ockenfels utility function, an equal split of the 
bargaining pie is always preferred to a split where the other bargainer receives more than half of 
the (same) pie.  For this reason, the seller should never choose a start price of less than half the 
pie, 10 €.  The rest of formal proof then straightforwardly follows the proof of Statement 2 in 
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).  Intuitively, inequitable offers in the BT treatment will not be 
accepted by buyers who prefer the equitable (zero) allocation that results if the offer is not 
accepted, and for this reason, the optimal price offer is less than 20 €. 
Proof of (2i):  A price of 18 € would yield a payoff of 2 € to the buyer, which is equitable 
and thus acceptable to all bidders.
17  The rest of the formal proof then follows the proof of 
Statement 9b in Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).  Intuitively, at a price offer of 18 €, all buyers are 
better off bidding and possibly winning, than not bidding and either having the no-trade outcome 
or allowing another buyer to make the trade.  Competition aligns absolute and relative payoffs so 
that buyers behave as if they are selfish.
18
Proof of (2ii):  In this case, the exact seller price offer depends on the trade-off between 
equity and selfish concerns of the seller, and may differ across models.
   
19
                                                 
17 An offer of 2 € is equitable and thus acceptable in the Bolton and Ockenfels model because it is the share the buyer 
would get if the efficiency gain from trade is equally distributed among all market participants (see Bolton and 
Ockenfels 1998 for an illustration in a laboratory 3-person bargaining game).  If one applies other fairness norms or 
uses a different definition of the reference group, other payoffs may be interpreted as fair (see, e.g., Bolton and 
Ockenfels 2005 and 2006 for discussions of different reference points for equity), which however would not affect 
the qualitative predictions. 
18  Suppose a trader’s utility is increasing in one’s pecuniary payoff but also depends on a relative payoff component.  
The relative payoff is defined as one’s share of the total payoff of all involved n traders, and is equal to 1/n in case all 
traders get zero payoffs.  Now suppose that utility is increasing in relative payoffs as long as the relative payoff is 
smaller than 1/n.  Then, losing in the competitive trading environment means that others will share the surplus, 
implying the worst possible outcome: zero pecuniary and zero relative payoffs.   
19 Bolton (1991), for instance, postulates that traders do not care about equity when they are in a favoured situation.  
As a consequence, CT-sellers in Bolton’s model, who are in a favoured position, behave just like sellers in the 
standard model and maximize their revenues as assumed in the discussion above.  The models by Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) are consistent with price-offers well below 20 € but differ with respect to 
the formulation of equity reference point; in Fehr and Schmidt traders evaluate their payoffs in comparison to each 
other trader, whereas in Bolton and Ockenfels traders only care about their relative status with respect to the whole 
reference group.  Social utility models based on psychological game theory also differ with respect to equity 
reference points.   
  If the seller’s ideal 
selling price is 18 € or less (not below 2 € in the Bolton and Ockenfels model), then the optimal 
strategy is to set a BIN-price at the ideal level.  This offer is acceptable to all buyers (and using   13 
the auction format risks a higher final price).  If the seller’s ideal selling price is strictly between 
18 € and 20 €, then the seller must weigh the risk of having such an offer not accepted (see 
discussion below) against having the competitive outcome or an outcome of 18 € or less (the 
latter two can be had with probability 1), and the decision reached can differ depending on the 
precise specification of the utility function.  However, it is always the case that the seller uses the 
BIN-option to make the price offer, since using the auction format risks a higher price settlement 
than the fair-minded seller would like. 
   
As stated in the alternative hypothesis, social preference models imply that sellers may 
want to choose an auction with a start price below valuations even though valuations are common 
knowledge.  To understand this more clearly, observe that the null hypothesis equilibrium offer 
of 20 € is not a reasonable perfect Bayesian equilibrium offer with Bolton and Ockenfels social 
preferences because accepting is weakly dominated by not bidding at all: If nobody accepts, the 
outcome is equitable (all market participants receive zero payoffs), and if one or more buyers 
accept, all buyers still receive zero pecuniary but now inequitable payoffs with respect to the 
seller’s payoff.  (Price offers strictly between 20 and 18 € also run a risk of attracting no bids, 
depending on the exact preferences of the bidders.)   
As under selfish preferences, there are coordinated bidding equilibria in the open eBay 
format.
20
                                                 
20 For a coordinated early-bidding equilibrium, observe that an early bid of 20 € by another bidder implies zero 
pecuniary payoffs and zero relative payoffs regardless of one’s own bid (as long as it does not lead to negative 
payoffs), so that the incentive to compete against a 20 €-bid is weak with social as well as selfish preferences. 
 Importantly, demanding the whole  cake is (unlike in the scenario with selfish 
preferences) no resort for the seller in models with social preferences.  Fair-minded buyers have 
good reasons to reject very greedy offers, but even fair-minded bidders dissipate all buyer rents in 
an auction once they get locked into competition. 
We finally note that the analyses above abstract away from some influences that might 
potentially also affect behavior.  Most notably, one might think that eBay’s feedback system 
opens the door for other equilibria that may confound social preference predictions, and that the 
transaction costs in our field settings are larger than in corresponding laboratory settings.  We 
discuss these issues when we present and interpret the evidence.  
   14 
III. Trading behavior 
  We first investigate seller behavior in both treatments, and then separately analyze buyer 
behavior in competitive and bilateral trading environments.  Section III.4 discusses the potential 
effect of reputation building via eBay’s feedback forum on social concerns, and vice versa.  
  As with lab experiments, we had some ‘no-shows’:  In the bilateral trading environment, 4 
(out of 50) sellers did not submit an offer to eBay.   In the competitive trading environment, 1 
(out of 30) sellers did not submit an offer.  Analyses are based on the remaining observations.  
Analyses of payoffs and revenues are net of eBay’s fees, which were paid by the experimenter. 
 
III.1 Seller behavior: format choice and price offer  
 
Table 1.  Tabulation of offer channel selected by sellers 
  auction  BIN (buy-it-now)  auction with BIN-
option  Total 
BT  12  16  18  46 
CT  17  1  11  29 
 
  Table 1 tabulates the choices of the offer channels and shows that the sellers’ choices 
depend on the treatment (chi-square, p = 0.002).  More specifically, when we neglect the hybrid 
format, there is a slight but not significant tendency to use a fixed price format in the bilateral 
trading environment BT (binomial, p = 0.572), while there is a strong and highly significant 
tendency to make use of competitive bidding in the competitive environment CT (p < 0.001).  
This pattern of format choice is suggested by the alternative hypothesis in the sense that buyer 
competition in CT-auctions can avoid problems associated with buyer resistance to accept high 
BIN price offers (see section II.4).  It is, however, also consistent with the null hypothesis, 
because every choice is in line with the selfish equilibrium outcome.     
  The pattern of format choices in our experiment may not only be affected by isolated 
equilibrium considerations.  It has been reported that outside experience influences a subject’s 
behavior within an experiment (Burns 1985, Dyer et al. 1989, Cooper et al. 1999, Bolton et al. 
2011).  In line with this literature, we observe that a seller’s trading experience and preferences 
that evolved in the field, outside of the experiment, also influences format choice.  After the 
experiment, on 12/12/2005, we downloaded transaction data of our subjects available on eBay. 
This data on trading histories include all transaction data if the transaction took place not earlier   15 
than 9/9/2005 and when the transaction partner left feedback (on eBay Germany, other data were 
not available).  The history data show that those BT-sellers who chose the auction (BIN) format 
have a significantly higher probability of choosing an auction (BIN) in non-experimental eBay 
encounters (Mann-Whitney  U, two-tailed,  p  = 0.028 for the auction and 0.000 for the BIN 
format; the corresponding effect for auction plus BIN-option is with p = 0.286 not significant).  
Analogous effects hold for CT-sellers (p-values are 0.003, 0.014, and 0.009).  This demonstrates 
that the trading strategies in our experimental setting mirror the sellers’ individual trading 
patterns on eBay in naturally occurring field encounters. 
 

























Figure 1 shows the initial price offers posted by sellers in bilateral and competitive 
trading.
21  For the instances in which the seller chooses the hybrid format involving an auction 
start price and a fixed price, we define the price offer as the minimum of the two, which by eBay 
rules, must be the auction start price.  Overall, only a single price offer is consistent with our null 
hypothesis (19.99 or 20 €).  The modal offer is 10 €, the equal split, in BT and 1 €, the default 
start price on eBay, in CT.
22
                                                 
21 As will become clear later, these price offers are not necessarily identical with the price offers eventually accepted 
or not accepted (e.g., Figure 5), so we call them “initial.” 
22 Price offers in BT are higher than in CT (Mann-Whitney U, two tailed, p < 0.001).   
   If we include selfish equilibria where sellers rely on buyer 
competition driving the price up to 20 €, all offers in CT are in equilibrium, yet all but one offer 
in BT are not.  The alternative hypothesis does only somewhat better.  While ‘social equilibrium’ 
is in principle consistent with offers strictly below 20 € in both CT and BT, price offers below the   16 
equal split in BT (28 percent) are out-of-equilibrium regardless of whether preferences are social 
or selfish.
23
One interesting individual example along these lines is a seller who dealt with the lack of 
buyer competition by shill bidding.  Shill bidding is an illegal attempt by sellers to raise the price 
by bidding oneself or through a confederate just below the buyer’s maximum bid.  The seller 
chose a start price of 1 € and later submitted shill bids to increase the final price to 5.50 €.  Why 
do we suspect shill bidding?  For one, the first part of the name of the bidder, who submitted the 
shill bids and who was not registered at our experiment, is identical with the last name of the 
   
Offers of below 50 percent are sometimes observed in laboratory games, where the 
specific pattern of behavior suggests they are mostly mistakes rather than attempts to be generous. 
For example, in the first two rounds of Roth et al.’s (1991) large ultimatum game experiment, 9.3 
percent of the observed offers were below 50% of the pie, but by final rounds 9 and 10 none of 
the offers were below 50%.  This suggests that the initial offers below 50% in our experiment 
were due to inexperience rather than preference.  Prior to trading, we quizzed sellers to ensure 
they understood there would be only one potential buyer (see questionnaire in Appendix).  So the 
rate of these kinds of mistakes is likely due to sellers who did not know from previous experience 
on eBay how to handle the lack of competition in BT (in section III.2 we will see that a low start 
price in CT is a quite sensible strategy).   
This view is weakly supported by a closer look at sellers’ eBay histories from outside the 
experiment.  Those BT-sellers who placed a price offer smaller than the equal split were 
generally less experienced with the use of auctions and start prices.  For instance, BT-sellers who 
chose auction start prices below the equal split generally placed smaller start prices on eBay than 
the other sellers (an average start price of 1.92 € versus 7.06 €; Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p 
= .021), suggesting that those sellers are less familiar with utilizing start prices.  Also, BT-sellers 
with offer prices below the equal split are somewhat less inclined to choose the BIN format, a 
more ‘natural’ choice in bilateral bargaining (an average proportion of BIN-offers relative to all 
eBay offers of 4.5 percent versus 25.8 percent; Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p = .111).  Finally, 
the average feedback score of those BT-sellers with price offers below the equal split is 95 versus 
224 for the other sellers, and the average number of auctions conducted is 4.5 versus 10.2, though 
these differences are not statistically significant.  
                                                 
23 We treat a 9.99 € offer here and elsewhere in the paper as equitable.  Such low offers also cannot be rationalized 
by maximin or efficiency preferences as, e.g., proposed by Charness and Rabin (2002).   17 
seller.  Second, we found four non-experimental auctions on eBay run by our seller, where the 
same bidder submitted non-winning bids.  So it seems likely that the seller adopted shill bidding 
from his eBay experience outside the experiment.
24
                                                 
24 We did not include shill bidding in our theory, because it is neither allowed nor advantageous for sellers to employ 
shill bidding strategies in our environment.  For instance, as explained in section II.4, CT-sellers can always 
guarantee a price of 20 € without any shill bidding and regardless of whether the bidders are selfish or fair-minded.  
Moreover, CT-buyers can protect themselves against shill bidding by matching the seller’s initial price offer in the 
sense that any shill bid would then have to outbid the buyer.  Because all rules of eBay applied in our experiment, we 
excluded neither the seller nor the bids of the shill bidder when computing the final payoffs.  If eBay had closed the 
auction because of shill bidding (as it happened once in our competitive trading environment), the game payoffs to 
all participants would have been zero, just like on eBay.  
   
Summing up, we find that with only one exception, sellers do not try to skim all rents 
directly through their price offer, as predicted by our null hypothesis.  As we will see in the next 
subsection, some of this can be rationalized by sellers’ reliance on buyer competition in CT or by 
sellers’ anticipation of buyers’ resistance to accept high price offers in BT.  However, even when 
taking this into account, some BT-sellers still fail to make use of their commitment power: they 
choose price offers too low to be consistent with any selfish or social equilibrium.  The data 
provides some evidence that this behavior is related to a lack of previous experience on eBay, 
gained outside our experiment, how to handle the lack of competition in BT.  
 
III.2 Buyer behavior in competitive trading 
Figure 3 shows the final prices (seller profits) realized in the 29 competitive markets.  
Observe that whenever bidders competed in auctions (the 20 dark bars in Figure 3), the final price 
was above 19 €.  In 14 of these auctions the price was as predicted by equilibrium theory (19.99 € 
or 20 €).  In 5 auctions, prices were in a range between 19.50 € and 19.98 €.  This price range 
describes stable, competitive outcomes of the bidding process, because the minimum bidding 
increment is 0.50 €, implying that no bidder can profitably alter the outcome once the price 
reached this range.  Only in one CT-auction was the final price below 19.50 €, namely 19.09 €.   
The close match between competitive market data and theory is also observed in the laboratory 
(ex., the competitive markets reported in Roth et al. 1991). 
   18 
 























The success of auctions with respect to revenues and the large agreement with prices 
predicted by equilibrium theory – for both selfish and social preferences – is remarkable, given 
that sellers gave more control away over the price discovering process than theory says is 
necessary.  In particular, observe that in 15 out of the competitive 20 auctions, the start price was 
1 €.  From a selfish equilibrium perspective, low start prices run the risk of low revenues via 
coordinated early or late bidding equilibria.  The lower the start price the higher the potential 
gains from collusion.
25  While the social preference models suggest that a seller may choose a 
low auction price, acceptable to buyers, in order to get competitive bidding going, an offer of 1 € 
is smaller than what is needed to attract bidding (because it would give the buyer more than his 
fair share).  So, in this sense, it may seem surprising that sellers do not make more use of their 
commitment power – regardless of whether preferences are selfish or social.
26
The occurrence of low revenues (the eight light bars in Figure 3) is not the result of failed 
competition.  It is rather due to the corresponding sellers’ choices not to make use of buyer 
competition by offering a BIN price.  All trades that ended with the acceptance of a BIN-offer 
ended with seller profits below or equal to 18 €.  There are at least two possible reasons for 
  As it turns out, 
however, buyers were not able to take advantage of sellers’ low price-offers:  Virtually all buyer 
payoffs were competed away.  This rationalizes the use of even very low offers in CT. 
                                                 
25 This follows directly from the analysis by Ockenfels and Roth (2006); see also Klemperer (2000), who forcefully 
argues in the context of spectrum auctions that high reserve prices may prevent collusion. 
26 Three other sellers choose the equal split as auction start price, which may be interpreted as a ‘fair’ offer to attract 
bidders.  (The other two start prices were 2 € and 3 €.)   19 
choosing BIN-prices below the competitive level.  First, as explained before, fair-minded sellers 
may be willing to leave some money for the buyers.  Second, sellers may underestimate the 
power of competition and believe that a BIN-offer below competitive level may yield higher 























 but there is evidence that 
some traders underestimated the implication of competition for prices.  For one, there were three 
buyers who rejected the BIN-offer when the sellers chose the hybrid offer format, and instead 
submitted a bid which started the auction.  In all three cases, the winning buyers later faced a 
final price that was well-above the initially offered BIN-price.  This behavior is inconsistent with 
both standard and social preference theory.  It appears that these buyers wrongly thought that 
they could get better prices in the auction.  Also, the one market that ended with zero payoffs to 
the seller (Market 1 in Figure 3) was removed by eBay before the market was supposed to end, 
because of shill bidding on the part of the seller.  As a consequence, all game payoffs were zero.  
This seller, too, seemed to have underestimated the robust power of competition, apparently 
seeing a need to push competition.   
 
Figure 4.  Realized prices (seller profit) in the 46 bilateral trading encounters 
 
III.3 Buyer behavior in bilateral trading 
Figure 4 sorts the final prices (seller profits) in the 46 BT encounters. Zeros are due to not 
accepted offers. The average final price (seller payoff) is 7.17 €, compared to 17.76 € in CT.  The 
hypothesis of equal revenues is strongly rejected (Mann Whitney U, two-tailed,  p  <  0.001).  
                                                 
27 For instance, there is no evidence that those CT sellers who used BIN are less experienced, as measured by the 
feedback score.   20 
There is also a much wider variance in BT final prices.  Eleven encounters ended in zero profits, 
the maximum seller profit was 17 €.  None ended close to the 20 € seller profit expected under 
selfish preferences.  
 



















accepted and not accepted not accepted
 
Figure 5 helps to understand the large variance in final price.  It displays the pattern of 
offers accepted and not accepted in bilateral trading. An offer is defined as accepted when the 
buyer accepted the BIN price or submitted a winning bid in the auction, respectively.  An offer is 
defined as not accepted when neither a BIN-offer is taken nor any valid auction bid is submitted.  
Of course, we do not know for sure why any particular offer was not accepted.  One might think, 
for instance, that transaction costs could have deterred some bidders to accept an offer.  Thus, 
after the experiment was completed, we asked all BT-buyers to briefly explain their strategy.  We 
discuss the results at the end of this subsection. 
Figures 4 and 5 mix a pattern of behavior common to laboratory observation with  a 
pattern rarely seen in laboratories.  Starting with the latter, there are 10 sellers who earn profits 
which lie strictly in between 0 € and the equal split.  This phenomenon is the result of accepted 
price offers in this range, which seem to be partly explained by inexperienced sellers, inept at 
handling the lack of competition (as discussed in section III.1).  Two of these price offers (both at 
1 €) as well as one equal split offer are not accepted, even though they would have yielded high   21 
absolute respectively equitable payoffs to the buyers.
 28  While rejections of price offers below 
the equal split are sometimes observed also in laboratory research and are not necessarily 
inconsistent with social utility models,
29 the rejection of the fair offer is not captured by the social 
utility models. In any case, all three buyers  told us after the experiment that they actually 
intended to submit a bid but then unfortunately missed eBay’s deadline for bidding.  So, 
following the buyers’ explanation, not accepting those offers cannot be interpreted as “rejections”, 
but must rather be attributed to the loss of control in our field experiment.  In all other cases of 
non-acceptance, the buyers who responded to our question told us that, given the low offer, they 
did not want to submit a bid (two buyers did not respond to our question).  The rest of the buyer 
behavior looks pretty much like what has been observed in laboratory bargaining experiments.  
Overall, 24 percent (11/46) of the offers were not accepted, leading to zero seller and zero buyer 
payoffs.  If one takes into account only offers equal or larger than the equal split, 26 percent 
(9/34) of the offers were not accepted. Furthermore, all four ‘greedy’ offers starting at 18 € were 
not acceptable to buyers.  There is a correlation between the price offer and whether it was 
accepted (Spearman rho = .28, p = 0.060, two-tailed); when we drop those three offers that were 
unintentionally rejected or if we restrict ourselves to offers above the equal split, the correlation 
becomes stronger (rho = .50, p = 0.001, and rho = .379, p = 0.027, respectively).
30
  The reader may have noticed that the distribution of offers accepted and not accepted in 
Figure 5 is in parts somewhat shifted to the right compared to the distribution of the initial price 
offers in Figure 1.  There are two reasons.  The first reason is shill bidding: one of the sellers with 
an auction start price of 1 € submitted shill bids to increase the price to 5.50 € (see section III.1).  
So, the initial price offer differed from the final offer eventually accepted by the buyer.  The 
second reason is that in five out of the 18 cases in which BT-sellers selected the hybrid selling 
format (auction with BIN-option), buyers accepted the BIN price even though it was higher than 
 
                                                 
28 Because eBay employs second-price auctions, the final price in an auction with only one bidder is equal to the start 
price, regardless of the number of bids and the bid amounts, as long as the highest bid is larger than the start price.  
So, in these cases, even fair-minded buyers could not increase the price in order to get more equitable outcomes.   
29 Several other experimental studies including Bornstein and Yaniv (1998), Güth et al. (2007), Gehrig et al. (2007), 
Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2001), Mitzkewitz and Nagel (1993), Bolton et al. (2006) and Roth et al. (1991) report 
rejections  of offers that are advantageous to the buyer.    Bolton and Ockenfels’  (2000)  social utility model is 
consistent with this phenomenon. 
30 Our rejection rate is close to what is observed in the Roth et al. (1991) laboratory ultimatum bargaining game, 
where 26.4 percent of the offers were rejected (there was no significant second mover experience effect).  However, 
because there is heterogeneity across standard laboratory ultimatum games (e.g., Slonim and Roth 1998), we do not 
make quantitative claims here; calibrations of social utility functions are presented in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and 
DeBruyn and Bolton (2008), among others.     22 
the auction start price.
31
  We suspect that the phenomenon of BT-buyers who take the higher BIN price could be 
partly caused by risks of ‘irregular’ bidding in the field, which are controlled away in the 
laboratory.  The risks come from fraudulent shill bidding or from active bidders who are not 
registered for the experiment and just bid for fun or out of curiosity.
  Thus, because price offers in Figure 1 are defined as the minimum price 
that can be accepted and Figure 5 only shows offers that are eventually accepted, the distributions 
differ. 
32  In fact, we did not only 
have two rather unambiguous cases of shill bidding, but four more eBay users, not registered at 
our experiment, who submitted bids to our experimental offers (none of the bids won).  The BIN 
offer might command a premium to protect the BT-buyer from these risks (although the risk is 
small: there is only one instance of bidding by unregistered traders in BT).  This explanation 
implies that those who took BIN offers would prefer to close the transaction quickly.  In fact, 
BIN-offers were significantly more likely to be accepted earlier than start-price offers as 
measured in seconds before the offer terminates (Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, p = 0.023).
33
However, it is very unlikely that transaction costs explain the behavior of our BT-buyers.  
As we mentioned before, buyers who did not accept a small share of the gains from trade 
explicitly told us that they were rejecting an unfair offer or unfair behavior; the three exceptions 
concern the price offers at or below the equal split.  Social concerns also explain why the modal 
offer is the equal split, which would not easily be explained by transaction costs arguments.  
Even more importantly, transaction costs of bidding were negligible by the experimental design.  
For one, the overall transaction costs of participating in the experiment are lower than 
 
Finally, we comment on the hypothesis that uncontrolled transaction costs might play in 
the interpretation of our field experiment.  In fact, if buyers differ with respect to transaction 
costs associated with bidding, the probability that a BT-offer is accepted would decrease with the 
price-offer, because a buyer’s payoff must be larger than the corresponding transaction costs for a 
trade to occur.  At the same time, prices are high in CT if there is a sizeable fraction of bidders in 
the population with negligible transaction costs.  So, some of the patterns we observe in the 
experiment might be due to factors not related to preferences. 
                                                 
31 The average difference between BIN and auction start price in these 5 cases is 3.30 €. 
32 We followed a chat room discussion of two eBay bidders, not registered at the experiment, discussing the 
possibility of submitting bids on our auctions just out of curiosity.  
33 One reason for eBay buyers to prefer BIN-offers is impatience.  In our experiment, all subjects were paid at the 
same time after all auctions ended, so in this sense impatience cannot be part of the explanation.    23 
participating in typical laboratory experiments (while the stakes are significantly higher).  Traders 
did not have to be physically present at a certain time or certain place, and all communication 
was done asynchronously and electronically; in particular, bidding could typically take place at 
any time during a whole week.
34  An experienced eBay buyer could have completed the whole 
experiment, including registration, reading instructions and bidding, in probably 5-15 minutes.  
The actual bidding, once bidders are registered and sit in front of the computer, may take 
probably between 10 seconds up to a minute, mostly depending on whether the bidder is already 
logged in on eBay, or not.
35
EBay employs an electronic reputation mechanism that enables buyers and sellers to leave 
feedback (“positive”, “negative”, or “neutral”) on each other after a successful transaction.
 (Unlike for eBay transactions outside our experiment, there is no 
need for searching the platform, researching the value of the offered product, or assessing the 
‘trustworthiness of the offer’.) Recall also that we only invited experienced eBay traders, who 
already had an eBay account and successfully completed transactions on eBay, and who were 
available at the time of the experiment (which was explicitly required in the invitation email).  In 
order to further minimize transaction costs, we conducted the experiment during a University 
teaching period in Germany so that traders were unlikely to be on vacation and had easy and 
frequent access to the Internet (either at the University or at home), we wired all payoffs with no 
confirmation or signature required, we paid all pecuniary transactions costs (eBay and bank fees), 
and there was no shipping and handling involved in our eBay transactions.  It seems hard to 
imagine a field experiment that establishes lower or less controlled opportunity costs of trading.  
Finally, complementary laboratory data reinforce our point: transaction costs are not necessary to 
produce social bargaining patterns – although transaction costs could of course reinforce the 
behavior.   
 
III.4 Reputation building behavior 
36
                                                 
34 One might argue, however, that if bidders have an incentive to bid late, the transaction costs associated with 
bidding at a certain time can be quite high.  However, as we have mentioned before, there is no incentive to bid late 
in our BT environment, and in fact we do not see last-minute bidding in BT.  Moreover, if bidders still wanted to bid 
late but could not do so because of high transaction costs, their best response is not to reject a low offer, but rather to 
bid early, when transaction costs are small. (Ockenfels and Roth 2005 show that bidding early is an equilibrium.)  
Alternatively, they could use artificial sniping agents that automatically place bids in the closing seconds of eBay 
auctions. 
35 Traders knew the stakes involved and the ‘games being played’ before  registering. So if transaction costs 
prevented some traders to take part in the experiment, one could expect that these traders chose not to go through the 
registration procedure, which was much more time consuming than the actual bidding. 
36 See Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) for an early description and analysis of eBay’s mechanism.  
    24 
Leaving feedback on the trading partner can on the one hand confound social behavior, and on 
the other hand be another effective way of expressing social behavior.  Furthermore, the 
“reputation” of a trader, that is, the percentage of positives gained in non-experimental ‘natural’ 
transactions, may have predictive value for behavior in our experiment.  Here, we investigate 
both hypotheses. 
A number of field and lab studies show that eBay’s feedback score tends to affect both 
future revenues and probabilities of sale (Dellarocas 2006, Resnick et al. 2006, Bolton et al. 
2004).  Furthermore, some eBay observers inferred from field data that not giving feedback may 
be an indicator of an unsatisfactory transaction.  Dellarocas and Woody (2008), for instance, state 
that their “results confirm the wide-spread belief that eBay traders are substantially more likely to 
post feedback when satisfied than when dissatisfied” (see also Klein et al. 2007).  Part of the 
reason is fear of retaliatory negative feedback: giving negative feedback increases the probability 
of receiving negative feedback (Bolton et al. 2010).  If our experiment captures natural trading 
patterns, these field observations suggest that we should observe buyers in our bilateral 
bargaining environment to leave positive feedback when their bargaining payoff was high and to 
leave no or negative feedback when the payoff was small.
37
In our BT condition, 11 offers were rejected, so we have 35 encounters where feedback 
could be given.  From these, 16 buyers left no feedback on the respective seller, 18 left positive 
feedback and one left a neutral feedback;
  
Overall, in the bilateral trading environment, we observe that the propensity to give 
feedback in our experiment  is  roughly  in line with Resnick and Zeckhauser's (2002) field 
observations.  In their huge data set obtained from eBay, buyers commented on sellers for 52 
percent of the items (52 percent in our experiment), sellers on buyers 61 (73) percent of the time, 
and 99.1 (98.4) percent of the feedback provided by buyers was positive.  
38
                                                 
37 Of course, in more complex transaction, satisfaction with a transaction may depend on many dimensions, such as 
quality of the item, quality of communication, shipping time and costs etc.  In our experiment, however, the only 
dimension which can plausibly be the basis of feedback giving is the distribution of pecuniary payoffs. 
38 The neutral one occurred in the bargaining with shill bidding; the buyer left a comment “I suspect shill bidding. 
Otherwise ok.” (translation from German).   
 25 BT-sellers left feedback.  We find that the average 
buyer payoff when no feedback was given is 9.18 €, while the average payoff when positive 
feedback was given is 11.76 €.  The difference is statistically significant (Mann Whitney U test, 
one-tailed, p = 0.042).  This observation supports the hypothesis in the literature – that “silence”   25 
correlates with dissatisfaction – in a controlled field environment.  It also shows that BT-buyers 
do not only punish by rejecting but also use the feedback mechanism as a reciprocation device.
39
One might at first glance suspect that a concern for a good reputation is sufficient to 
explain the social behavior we observe in BT.  The prospect of being rewarded with a good 
feedback may be a good incentive for traders to behave ‘fairly’.  But such reputational concerns 
cannot explain the key phenomenon on the buyer side: rejections in the BT-treatment.  The 
reason is that on eBay, traders can only give feedback after the seller’s offer is actually accepted.  
This implies that by rejecting unfair offers buyers not only forgo monetary profits, but they also 
make it impossible to improve their own reputation, and to use eBay’s feedback forum to 




The way reputation building interacts with trading behavior raises the question whether a 
trader’s reputation information carries information about individual trading inclinations, which in 
turn have predictive value for the trading strategies employed in our experiment.  In particular, 
one might hypothesize that ‘greedy’ BT-sellers tend to generally have more problems with eBay 
buyers, outside experimental control, and thus are more likely to have lesser eBay reputations. 
However, the effect, if any, can be expected to be small, because unfair offers may not be 
accepted in the first place and traders with relatively low reputations are avoided and probably 
even crowded out.  In fact, the data point to the right direction, but the effect is not quite 
significant at conventional levels.  The average reputation (that is, percentage positive) of those 
who offer the equal split is 99.8 percent, while the average reputation of those sellers who 
demand more is 99.6 percent, which is however not significant when applying a Mann Whitney 
  
                                                 
39 In CT, we have 28 encounters in which feedback could have been given.  14 buyers and 21 sellers gave feedback, 
and all feedback was positive.  There is no significant correlation between buyer payoffs and feedback giving.  
40 Also, observe that the trader who naturally wants to build up a reputation in our bargaining game is the buyer: he 
could profit from being known as somebody who rejects low offers. However, on eBay, the seller cannot condition 
his offer on the buyer’s reputation. Rather, the seller must make the offer without knowing the buyer and the buyer’s 
reputation, so that this kind of reputation building is not valuable to buyers.  Our experimental design reflects this.  
Sellers did not know anything about buyers before actually posting their binding offer on eBay.  (Moreover, we 
insisted that all offers are made public simultaneously, up to the second, so to keep seller behavior independent.)  
Regarding anonymity issues, we minimized the probability that traders know each other, or have a common history 
or future on eBay by matching traders from different cities.  Finally, all traders were asked not to communicate with 
each other: (a) sellers were told to post their offers under a specific eBay category, and to use a specified item 
description, in order to suppress any communication between traders, and (b) all traders were asked to send any 
questions to us. Accordingly, we have no indication that a trader tried to directly contact other traders that could have 
diminished anonymity among traders  or that matching partners did know more about opponents than what is 
revealed on eBay, which is eBay-identities and feedback.      26 
U test.  The Spearman rank correlation between seller reputation and corresponding price offers 
yields – 0.205 at a one-tailed significance level of 0.086.   
An alternative interpretation of the correlation could be that those who demand more for 
themselves are more experienced, and that more experience implies a higher probability of 
having received a negative feedback, just because more experience implies more completed 
transactions.  In fact, the correlation between reputation and feedback score (as a measure of 
experience) is significantly negative (Spearman rho = – 0.270, one-tailed p = 0.035).  Moreover, 
the average feedback score of those who offer the equal split is 366, while the average score of 
the others is 131: 153 for those who demand more than the equal split, and 95 for those who 
demand less than the equal split (Mann Whitney U test, one-tailed, p = 0.099).  More experience 
may make you more familiar with the strategic incentives, but it may also make you more 
sensitive to the concerns of the trading partner.   
Finally, we ask whether and how buyers’ acceptance behavior is correlated with 
reputation scores. Are buyers who do not accept an offer in our bilateral bargaining environment 
more or less experienced than accepting buyers?  It can be argued either way.  On the one hand, 
rejecting may be a kind of mistake by inexperienced buyers.  On the other hand, there is evidence 
indicating that those who are experienced with markets may be more fair-minded (Henrich et al. 
2001).  Measuring experience by the feedback score, there is, however, no significant difference 
in the data.  Do buyers who do not accept have a better or worse reputation?  It may be that they 
are harder to make happy as a buyer (the resulting conflict leading to more negative feedback).  
Or maybe they behave in a fairer manner as a seller and expect the same treatment themselves.  
Measuring reputation as the percentage of positive feedback (as done by eBay), however, again 
yields no significant differences in the buyer data. 
 
IV. Related literature and discussion 
One of the first online-auction experiments was conducted by Lucking-Reiley (1999), 
who tested Vickrey’s revenue-equivalence theory by auctioning off “Magic game cards” to ‘real’ 
traders on self-engineered Internet auction platforms.  His methodological approach differs from 
ours in several respects.  Most importantly, Lucking-Reiley was willing to give up significant 
experimental control.  As he puts it (p. 1078): “My field experiments conduct unconditional tests 
of a theory’s predictions, because I do not observe whether or not the underlying assumptions of 
the theory are true. … Field tests assess the practical predictive power of a theory, since most   27 
theoretical assumptions in economic models are intrinsically unobservable in practice.”  This 
reasoning is compelling when, as in Lucking-Reiley’s study, holding the underlying model 
assumptions (for auctions concerning beliefs over the distribution of values and number of 
potential buyers, risk preferences, etc.) constant across treatments is sufficient to obtain a clear 
test.  However, such an assumption is not sufficient for testing the hypotheses we deal with here; 
the reason being that the nature of the underlying values is precisely what is in question. For 
example, if we had not induced (pecuniary) values for the trading object, then the interpretation 
of a non-acceptance in the bilateral treatment as evidence of social preferences would be 
confounded with the possibility that it simply reflects a low pecuniary value for the traded good 
of the respective buyer.  Which interpretation is valid has both theoretical and practical 
consequences for trader strategies and market efficiency: whether or not, in market circumstances 
with little competition, trader transgression of accepted norms of fairness leads to market 
inefficiency.   
How then can we know both that an experimental result is reflective of results in the fully 
natural environment and that the result stems from the underlying causes posited by the model?  
One way is a series of complementary field experiments, with controls ranging from tight to very 
loose.  If we observe essentially the same behavior across these experiments, we can be confident 
that the result reflects both natural behavior and posited causes.  While a complete picture has yet 
to emerge, our study is complementary, in this manner, to other field (as well as the lab 
experiments cited earlier) already in the literature. 
Our study is a “framed field experiment”, because of its “non-standard” subject pool, its 
field context, and because of subjects knowing that they are participating in an experiment (List 
2006a).  The study is closely related and mostly complementary to a series of framed field 
experiments by List.  First, building upon the classroom experiments by Chamberlain (1948) and 
Smith (1962; see also Plott, 1982, and Roth, 1995b), List (2004) observes that neoclassical 
competitive market theory explains the equilibrating forces in a double-auction both in laboratory 
markets and in framed field experiment conducted in sports card and collector pin marketplaces.  
This finding is further reinforced by our finding in the CT environment that competitive behavior 
is robust to the anonymous and complex electronic trading institutions as evolved on eBay, and to 
noisy, partly out-of-equilibrium seller behavior.  One difference to List’s work is that he induces 
competition on both  market sides, and then has buyers engage in unstructured, face-to-face 
bilateral  bargaining with sellers until they make a contract or the  respective  trading period   28 
terminates.  One implication of the design is that his and the corresponding earlier experiments 
lack the control necessary to make the kind of conclusions we do.  For example, in his specific 
market environment, it is difficult – if not impossible – both to derive clear-cut (non-cooperative) 
game theoretic equilibria, even if we rule out further complicating social preferences, and to 
isolate the respective roles of the bilateral bargaining and multilateral competition institutions on 
behavior and outcomes – which is a major, complementary goal of our study. 
In a second related paper, List (2006b) bridges lab and field behavior in carefully 
controlled lab and field gift-exchange environments, using sports card traders in a real sports card 
market.
41   His data suggest that the laboratory patterns are rather stable in framed field 
experiments, that is, against changes in subject pools, communication channels, framing and 
information scenarios.  Again, our study reinforces this finding in a different institutional and 
behavioral context.  For instance, List (2006b) studies positive reciprocity while our work is 
mainly concerned with negative reciprocity (e.g., a buyer can reject if the seller’s price-offer if 
perceived as unfair).
42  Moreover, our framed field experiment also supports List’s observation in 
his natural field experiment as well as the result of numerous laboratory experiments, that 
reputational concerns may play an important role in market transactions in that they can trigger 
behavior that is consistent with social preferences.
43
Finally, List (2006b) also conducted natural field experiments, where sellers did not know 
that they are taking part in an experiment, and where he identifies a much lesser role for social 
preferences. On the other hand, Falk (2007), Chen et al. (2010), Card et al. (2010) and Ockenfels 
et al. (2011) found, in very different contexts, a larger role for social preferences in natural field 
experiments.  We did not conduct a natural field experiment and so cannot directly contribute to 
  While our BT-traders use their influence on 
the trading partner’s reputation to reward fair and punish relatively unfair behavior, which may 
create additional incentives to make fair offers, reputation effects cannot explain rejections of 
unfair offers, the kind of negative reciprocity in bilateral bargaining that we observe in our study 
(see section III.4).    
                                                 
41 See also Gneezy and List (2006), who investigated social preferences in a field experiment of a labor market, 
which resembles a laboratory gift-exchange game environment.   
42 Laboratory results suggest an asymmetry regarding positive and negative reciprocity in that cooperation in positive 
reciprocity games, such as trust games or public goods games, tend to be less stable (Gneezy and List 2006 for gift 
exchange games, Ledyard 1995 for public good games, Bolton et al. 2004 for trust games), while negative 
reciprocity tends to be more robust (Roth 1995 for ultimatum games, Fehr and Gächter 2000 for public good games 
with punishment).   
43 For laboratory experiments see, e.g., Camerer and Weigelt (1988), McKelvey and Palfrey (1992), Jung et al. 
(1994), Andreoni and Miller (1999), Brandts and Figueras (2003), and Bolton et al. (2004).    29 
this question.  However, on the one hand even natural field experiments like List’s (2006b) insert 
controls which might influence behavior and outcomes,
44 and on the other hand it is almost 
inevitable to lose some control in natural compared to framed experiments.
45
There is also a related and fast-growing literature dealing with the economics of the eBay 
market (e.g., Lee and Malmendier, forthcoming; see Bajari and Hortacsu 2004, and Ockenfels et 
al. 2006 for surveys).  Most papers in this literature test auction theory, both in the uncontrolled 
field (e.g., Ockenfels and Roth 2006, Bajari and Hortacsu 2003) and in the fully controlled 
laboratory (e.g., Ariely et al. 2005).  Garrat, Walker and Wooders (2004) also  investigated 
bidding behavior of actual eBay buyers and eBay sellers.  They self-engineered an experimental 
second-price sealed-bid auction platform on the Internet and found that whether or not traders 
have experience with online auctions affect bidding behavior.  A number of papers examine the 
use of the BIN-option on eBay.  The literature mainly focuses on impatience and time 
preferences (e.g., Mathews 2004) and risk with respect to the uncertainty of buyer valuations (e.g., 
Reynolds and Wooders 2003).  On the other hand, our study suggests that risk with respect to 
‘irregular’ bidding on the buyer side, underestimating the power of competition and social 
  Therefore, we 
propose to also follow a complementary research venue: by exploiting the information about past 
trading patterns available on eBay, we investigate whether there are behavioral patterns in the 
controlled experiment that correspond to fully naturally occurring trading strategies devised by 
the same individual.  For instance, we have shown that the choice of the trading format and other 
strategies in the experiment can be partly linked to trading patterns in the uncontrolled field.  
Moreover, the fact that there is a correlation between BT price offers and receiving positive 
feedback in the framed experiment on the one hand, and feedback received earlier in the fully 
natural environment on the other hand (namely the seller reputation, although this latter 
correlation is only weakly significant) seems to suggest that some of the social patterns observed 
under experimental control mirrors fully natural behavior.  However, more research employing 
these different methodological venues is needed to robustly establish or reject the  various 
potential links.   
                                                 
44 For instance, in List’s (2006b) natural field experiment, buyers were instructed to approach 10 different, pre-
selected dealers, to make a pre-determined offer for a specified card, and to avoid haggling. 
45 For instance, in List’s (2006b) natural field experiment, sellers’ beliefs about the degree of seller competition was 
not controlled for (sellers may have wrongly thought that if they do not close the current deal at a good profit, some 
other seller would do it), whereas in the corresponding laboratory experiments it was known that each buyer was 
allowed to only approach one seller, more closely controlling the competitive environment and social embeddedness 
– as it is also typically the case in laboratory gift-exchange games.     30 
preferences on the seller side may also contribute to the success of eBay’s BIN-format.  A few 
papers have used the actual eBay platform for controlled experiments.  Jin and Kato (2008; see 
also Jin et al. 2010) conducted a field experiment on eBay, examining the link between price, 
quality, seller claims and seller reputation in markets for baseball cards.  They find, among other 
things, that some buyers are misled by non-credible claims of quality, paying higher prices but do 
not receive better quality.  They also partly attribute their data patterns to loopholes in the eBay 
reputation mechanism, which also is an area of active research  (Dellarocas 2006 provides a 
survey).  Here too, one stream of papers uses uncontrolled field data (e.g., Resnick and 
Zeckhauser 2002), and others brought eBay’s reputation system into the fully controlled 
laboratory (e.g., Bolton et al. 2004).  One paper which is close to ours in methodology, is Resnick 
et al.’s (2006) field experiment on eBay, investigating the impact of (manipulated) differential 
feedback reputation scores on revenue.  The design of the feedback system is investigated with 
the help of laboratory and natural field experiments by Bolton et al. (2010).  None of these online 
market studies investigates the impact of social preferences on bidding and trading behavior, and 
none is conducted to identify trading patterns that connect controlled laboratory and fully 
uncontrolled market behavior.  
 
V. Conclusions 
The data from our framed field experiment on eBay demonstrate that the social preference 
behavior observed for buyers under lab conditions extend to experienced traders operating in 
their natural trading system.   These social preferences may be obscured in an  uncontrolled 
environment by competition or incomplete information about the value of goods being traded, 
factors that cloud the visibility of social preferences in theory and in the lab.  Our data confirm 
that buyers in the bilateral trading environment are prepared to reject unfair price offers.  The 
social behavior cannot be explained by reputational concerns. Buyer competition, on the other 
hand, robustly yielded highly competitive outcomes, dissipating all buyer rents and giving sellers 
2.5 times higher revenues than without buyer competition.   
However, neither selfish nor social equilibria satisfactorily organize all behaviors.  Maybe 
the most notable out-of-equilibrium phenomenon in our field study is that some sellers fail to 
fully use their commitment power and their information about bidder numbers and valuations.  In 
particular, many auction start prices in both trading environments are too low – regardless of 
whether measured by standard or social preference theory.  The out-of-equilibrium seller   31 
behavior largely reflects traders’ market (in)experience outside the experiment.  While this hurts 
in bargaining, it turns out not to hurt in the competitive trading environment.  In fact, it tends to 
strengthen the dichotomy observed in the laboratory.  On the one hand, bargaining revenues are 
even more dispersed than in the laboratory.  On the other hand, competitive trading not only 
masks social preferences but is also robust against the increased strategic and institutional 
complexities on eBay.  There are miscalculations, noise and malfeasance behind otherwise 
competitive looking behavior. 
One of the principal lessons the present work has for the vetting of laboratory results in 
the field is the need for experiments that accommodate clear (game) theoretical predictions, and 
thus losing control in a very controlled way.  The greater complexity of the field environment 
produces a far richer pattern of behavior than observed in the lab.  Some of this behavior is an 
optimal strategic response to the more elaborate rules of the natural market.  Yet greater 
complexity also opens the door to increased out-of-equilibrium mistakes and noise, so that the 
underlying reasons for behavior can appear different than they actually are –  unless the 
experiment is sufficiently controlled to compare and parse explanations.   
Control implies abstracting away from real-world complexities.  In particular, the eBay 
traders in our controlled field experiment know more about the potential economic surplus from 
successful transactions than a typical eBay trader outside our experiment. Social preference 
models and laboratory data suggest that therefore social behavior is less an issue in the 
uncontrolled environment than it is in our controlled environment. However, this design choice 
was motivated by a desire to separate two competing explanations for selfishness in less 
controlled field studies: lack of social preferences  or lack of information about comparison 
standards.  
Moreover, we find that the behavior in our controlled field experiment is intertwined with 
uncontrolled field behavior.  A priori experience with eBay predicts our sellers’ format choice, 
the price offer and other trading strategies.  Past trades on eBay also affect the sellers’ eBay 
reputation, which is (weakly) related to the experimental bargaining behavior.  The influence also 
goes in the other direction; behavior in the experiment affects the sellers’ eBay reputation, and 
thus the outcome of future transactions.  Thus, the trading patterns we observe in our experiment 
predict and are predicted by trading patterns employed outside any experimental control; they 
mirror ‘natural’ trading patterns.  At the same time, our experiment demonstrates that, while 
eBay's reputation building stage cannot explain the social behavior we observe, it is used as an   32 
additional opportunity to bring social concerns into play.  This way, preferences and market 
institutions interact to promote social behavior. While our experimental set-up intervenes in the 
field in various ways, it is exactly this experimental control that allows us to make the connection 
between the controlled laboratory world and the uncontrolled world of economic transactions.   
A full understanding of the role of social preferences in markets requires a series of 
complementary studies.  Our study is open to relatively easy replication, as well as extension in 
various directions. Some extensions involve a changing or further loosening of control to check 
for the marginal effects of such factors as incomplete information about values or selling ‘real’ 
items, allowing more social interaction and communication between traders, endogenizing the 
number of traders, not telling subjects that they are participating in an experiment etc.  For 
instance, social behavior has more dimensions than outcome-based social comparison, including 
reciprocity and procedural fairness. It would be interesting to investigate whether and how the 
role of these other social concerns changes as information about others' payoffs is gradually taken 
away, in a controlled way.  With the emergence of online trading platforms, a highly controlled 
and flexible analysis of field behavior is feasible.  
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Appendix 
Instructions sent by email to subjects in BT [Translation from German] 
(Instructions in CT are completely analogous.) 
Subject:  Invitation eBay-Experiment 
To:  (…)  
From:  eBay-Experiment <ebay@lab.uni-koeln.de> 
 
Dear  (…),  
Thank you very much for your registration and your interest in our eBay Project.  Today we offer you to take part in an eBay experiment.  Please 
read this email carefully to the end.  Then decide whether you want to participate or not. 
In the experiment you will either be a seller or a potential buyer of a fictitious good (called “certificate”) on eBay.  Information on your role will 
be sent to you in another email at the beginning of the experiment. 
 
Rules for sellers: 
- The certificate has no intrinsic value.  If the certificate is not sold, the seller will not receive any payoff.  If the certificate is sold, we will transfer 
the final price to the seller’s bank account. 
- The seller ca choose the selling format on eBay (auction, auction with Buy It Now Option, or fixed price (Buy it Now)).  For further information 
on the selling options, go to: http://pages.ebay.de/help/sell/ia/angebotsformate.html  
- All eBay fees including the Listing Fee, the Final Value Fee, the Buy It Now fee, and the Scheduled Listings Fee, will be paid by us, regardless 
of whether the certificate is sold.  We do not refund any expenses for optional features that promote the good, however, such as subtitle, eBay 
Picture Service, or Listing Designer. 
- The offer must start on Monday October 10
th 2005 at 3pm (Scheduled Listings Option) and must not run longer than 10 days.  The category and 
the item description will be determined by us. 
- The seller can post her listing only once.  There will be no second chance to sell the certificate if the first attempt fails.   
- Otherwise, all eBay rules apply. 
- After having posted the listing on eBay, the seller will inform us about the eBay item number.  We will check the offer and verify its compliance 
with our requirements.  Then we will send the web address of the listing to a randomly chosen buyer. 
- Important: There will be only 1 (one) potential buyer for the certificate! 
 
Rules for buyers: 
- The value of the certificate to the buyer is €20.  If the buyer chooses to buy we will transfer €20 minus the price the certificate sold for to the 
buyer’s account.  If the buyer does not to buy, there will be no money transfer. 
- All eBay rules apply.   
- Important: If the payable price exceeds €20, the buyer pays more than the certificate is worth to him or her. In that case the buyer must pay the 
difference to us! (All eBay rules apply; in particular all bids are binding!) 
 
Rules for all participants: 
Our payment obligation does only apply to the sellers’ listings that we verified and transferred to a randomly chosen buyer.  Payments will be 
made only if you use the eBay user ID you submitted upon registration.  If you sell or buy a different certificate or use a different eBay user ID, 
you will not receive any money from us! 
  To facilitate the procedure, we will transfer the final price plus all fees to the registered seller, and €20 minus the final price to the 
registered buyer, as soon as the experiment is completed.  You do not have to pay any eBay fees or any fees for the money transfer. 
  If you are interested in taking part in the experiment and are available during the required time (Oct 10
th to Oct.  20
th 2005), please go 
to the following link and sign up; note that with your agreement to participate, you claim to have understood the above mentioned rules and 
conditions and you agree to them. 
http://www.lab.uni-koeln.de/ebay/teilnahmefragebogen.php?id=ux_ 
 
Before Friday October 7
th 2005 we will inform you whether you are a seller or a buyer in our experiment. 
Please do not hesitate to contact us at any time if you have any question: ebay@lab.uni-koeln.de 
Thank you! 
--- 
This email was automatically sent to you by the experiment participant system  
If you want to update your information or sign off, please send us an email to the following address: ebay@lab.uni-koeln.de  
Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research 
http://www.lab.uni-koeln.de  
 
Subject:  eBay-Beginning of Experiment 
To:  (…)  
From:  eBay-Experiment <ebay@lab.uni-koeln.de> 
 
Dear (…),  
Thank you very much for your willingness to participate in our research project.  You are a BUYER.  We will randomly select a seller for you and 
will inform you when the offer is posted. This will not be before Monday October 10
th 2005 at 3pm. 
Best regards 
Your Experiment Team  
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--- 
This email was automatically sent to you by …  
 
Subject:  eBay-Beginning of Experiment 
To:  (...) 
From:  eBay-Experiment <ebay@lab.uni-koeln.de> 
 
Dear (…),  
Thank you very much for your willingness to participate in our research project.  You are a SELLER.  Please create an offer taking into account 
the rules we outlined to you in our previous email.  The listing must be posted in the category: 
Collectibles > Technology & Tools > Science & Medicine > Miscellaneous 
 
The offer must start on October 10
th 2005 at 3pm (Scheduled Listing).  The offer must end at the latest on October 20
th 2005 at 3pm.  Apart from 
that, the duration of the listing can be chosen freely. 
The text in the offer must be: 
 
Item title:  “Certificate …” 
Item description: “Certificate … 
This offer is part of a research project.  The certificate is only of value to you, if you are a chosen participant and if you were informed about the 
item’s ID number by the project manager.  Please do not address any questions to the seller.” 
 
If there are any questions, you can forward them to us.  We will answer them. 
 
Delivery: “No Shipping – item needs to be picked up” 
Shipping: You must not ask for shipping costs. 
 
Please send us the eBay item ID number before October 10
th 2005 at 12pm. 
 
Best Regards, 
Your Experiment Team 
 
Please do not hesitate to contact us at any time if you have any question: ebay@lab.uni-koeln.de 
--- 
This email was automatically sent to you by …  
 
Subject:  Your eBay-offer … has been forwarded 
To:  (...) 
From:  eBay-Experiment <ebay@lab.uni-koeln.de> 
 
Dear  (…) 
 
Thank you very much for your email. 
Your offer on eBay follows our specifications.  The item ID number has just been forwarded to a randomly chosen buyer 
 
Best Regards, 
Your Experiment Team 
 
Please do not hesitate to contact us at any time if you have any question: ebay@lab.uni-koeln.de 
--- 
This email was automatically sent to you by …  
 
Subject:  Your eBay offer … 
To:  (...) 
From:  eBay-Experiment <ebay@lab.uni-koeln.de> 
   
Please confirm that you received this e-mail by sending a response e-mail to this mailing address.  Thank you. 
 
Hello (…), 
Thank you very much for your willingness to participate in our research project. 
Your auction has been posted here: … 
The corresponding eBay auction ID is: … 
The eBay offer started Oct 10
th 2005 at 3pm and ends in 10 days 
You are bidding for the certificate … 
We would like to remind you of the following: 
If you win the certificate at a final price higher than your value of  €20, you have to pay the difference to us.  If you do not place a successful bid, 
you will not receive any payoff.  (All eBay rules apply without exceptions; all bids are binding!) 
 
Thank you! 
Your Experiment Team 
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--- 
This email was automatically sent to you by …  
 
Subject:  End of eBay experiment:   … 
To:  (...) 
From:  eBay-Experiment <ebay@lab.uni-koeln.de> 
 
Dear (…) 
Thank you very much for your participation in our eBay experiment 
If you sold the certificate, you will receive the final price plus all eBay fees.  If there was no deal, you will only receive the fees. 
To simplify the payment process WE will do all money transfers, and YOU do not transfer any money.  Please be patient.  For accounting reasons, 
we can only transfer money, when we have received bank account information from all participants. 
 
There are two more things we would like you to do: 
1.  Please go the following link and answer some questions regarding the experiment 
http://www.lab.uni-koeln.de/ebay/verkaeuferfragebogen_mx.php?id=ux_  
2.  Please forward the following emails to us that you received from eBay:   “Sold eBay item” email or “eBay item not sold” email.  If you have 
already done so, you do not need to do it again.  We need the information to complete the experiment’s documentation. 
 
We hope you enjoyed our experiment. 
Best regards 
Your Experiment Team 
PS:  eBay rules apply to the evaluation process also:  participants can evaluate each other (only in the case of successful trades) 
 
Please do not hesitate to contact us at any time if you have any question: ebay@lab.uni-koeln.de 
--- 
This email was automatically sent to you by  
 
Subject:  End of eBay experiment:  … 
To:  (...) 
From:  eBay-Experiment <ebay@lab.uni-koeln.de> 
 
Dear (…),  
Thank you very much for your participation in our eBay experiment 
If you bought the certificate, you will receive the difference between the final price and your value of €20.  If there was no deal, you will not 
receive any money. 
To simplify the payment process WE will do all money transfers, and YOU do not transfer any money.  Please be patient.  For accounting reasons, 
we can only transfer money, when we have received bank account information from all participants. 
 
There are two more things we would like you to do: 
1.  Please go the following link and answer some questions regarding the experiment 
http://www.lab.uni-koeln.de/ebay/kaeuferfragebogen_mx.php?id=ux_ 
2.  .If you bought a certificate please forward the following email to us that you received from eBay:   “Bought eBay item” email.  If you have 
already done so, you do not need to do it again.  We need the information to complete the experiment’s documentation. 
 
We hope you enjoyed our experiment. 
Best regards 
Your Experiment Team 
PS:  eBay rules apply to the evaluation process also:  participants can evaluate each other (only in the case of successful trades) 
Please do not hesitate to contact us at any time if you have any question: ebay@lab.uni-koeln.de 
--- 
This email was automatically sent to you by … 
 
 
Questionnaire before the start of the experiment 
 
Before registering at our experiment, please read carefully your email and answer the following questions.  
1.  How many potential buyers are there?  
2.  What is the starting time of the offer? 
3.  What is the value of the certificate to the buyer? 
 
Example of screen shot: 
   41 
 